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The Issues of Bio- and Psychopolitics in Pandemic Times 
as Reminiscences of the Romantic Glorification of Life
A B S T RAC T
The present coronavirus pandemic has confronted each of us individually and 
our society at large with new existential and theoretical-practical challenges. 
In the following article I  present a  look at the pandemic from the point of 
view of biopolitics (Michael Foucault, Giorgio Agamben) and psychopolitics 
(Byung-Chul Han). The reflections on biopolitics and psychopolitics, on top 
of the terms they used, make us aware of the fragility of human life on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, they encourage us to look for historical equiva-
lents to our current struggle with the pandemic. For me, such an equivalent 
would be the culture of Romanticism: for example, works by Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Juliusz Słowacki, and Friedrich von Schelling. 
Starting from a short description of the Romantic era, I proceed to my goal 
which is to show how, during the pandemic, fundamental questions asked 
by biotechnology and psychopolitics come to the fore as questions about us, 
human beings, and our individual and social survival.
K E Y W O R D S :   biopolitics, psychopolitics, Romanticism, pandemic, bare life, 
homo sacer, achievement subjects
S T R E S Z C Z E N I E
Zagadnienia bio- i psychopolityki w czasach pandemii jako reminiscencje 
romantycznej gloryfikacji życia
Panująca pandemia koronawirusa konfrontuje każdego z nas indywidualnie, 
jak i nasze społeczeństwo z nowymi egzystencjalnymi i teoretyczno-praktycz-
nymi wyzwaniami. W  poniższym artykule przedstawię spojrzenie na pan-
demię z punktu widzenia biopolityki (Michael Foucault, Giorgio Agamben) 
i  psychopolityki (Byung-Chul Han). Refleksje nad biopolityką i  psycho-
polityką, jak i nad używanymi w nich pojęciami, uświadamiają nam z  jed-
nej strony kruchość naszego ludzkiego życia, a  z  drugiej strony skłaniają 
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do szukania historycznych odpowiedników naszego obecnego zmagania się 
z pandemią. Odpowiednikiem takim będzie dla mnie kultura romantyzmu: 
przykładowo poświęcone tej tematyce utwory Johanna W. von Goethego, Frie-
dricha Schillera, Juliusza Słowackiego, Friedricha von Schellinga. Wycho-
dząc od krótkiej charakterystyki okresu romantyzmu, stawiam sobie za cel 
pokazanie, jak w czasie pandemii na pierwszy plan wysuwają się fundamen-
talne pytania zadawane w ramach bio- i psychopolityki – pytania o nas, ludzi, 
o nasze przetrwanie indywidualne i społeczne.
S Ł O WA  K LU C Z E :  biopolityka, psychopolityka, romantyzm, pandemia, nagie 
życie, homo sacer, podmiot osiągnięć
Introduction
In the past months, we have seen scenes previously known only from the 
genre of Hollywood disaster movies displayed by both social and mass 
media: deserted streets, empty store shelves, overcrowded hospitals, and 
funeral halls full of coffins. The SARS-CoV-2 immobilized the world. Pol-
iticians, epidemiologists, and economists have given interviews present-
ing their statistics and versions of their assessment of the situation. The 
effectiveness of different types of vaccines has become a hot topic. Polit-
ical authorities have imposed far-reaching bans and restrictions, which 
have directly affected the economy, education, social and religious life. 
COVID-19 kills; therefore, life and saving it has become the center of the 
crisis. Information provided by the media concerns the nature of the virus, 
its spread, and the deadly threat that it poses mainly to certain segments 
of society.
 The silent, stealthy spread of the epidemic, disregarding national bor-
ders and reaching all levels of society, has united people and separated 
them from each other at the same time, in a very special way. Using the 
Internet as a medium, new groups of people have emerged who motivate 
each other in the struggle for survival (the so-called survivalists or prep-
pers), actively preparing for a long-term crisis, including possible radical 
changes in the social or political order on both a  local and global scale 
(cf. Bowles, 2020). On the other hand, other groups have been protesting 
against the restrictions being imposed on them under the slogans of free-
dom instead of dictatorship.
 Epidemics of all kinds have threatened humanity time and time again 
throughout history and taken many lives, from the biblical accounts of 
the ten plagues of Egypt to the great medieval plague (the Black Death). 
This is evidenced in literary and poetic works, from Homer’s Iliad (1924) 
to Giovanni Bocaccio’s Decameron (2000) to works of such contemporary 
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writers as Ling Ma (2018), who describes life in a futuristic New York City 
during an epidemic. The coronavirus pandemic has intensified the psy-
chological impact of such works of literature and allows them to be read in 
a new light.
 Can we learn anything from them with regard to how we approach the 
pandemic? Of course, we do know that history does not repeat itself, and 
that we are living in the times of the “fourth industrial revolution,” which 
in short is the era of the Internet and artificial intelligence. In times of pes-
tilence, the unifying element between different historical eras is the ques-
tion of basic survival, of human life, and saving it. However, it is not at all 
clear what we mean by “life,” and to what extent cutting off entire com-
munities from the rest of the world is “protecting” or “saving” lives. The 
multidimensionality of the coronavirus pandemic situation has thus been 
commented on by politicians, psychoanalysts, and social philosophers, as 
well as in popular science writings and academic studies (cf. Peters, 2020; 
Chandler, 2020) 1.
 The following article discusses a view on the pandemic from the per-
spective of issues discussed by so-called biopolitics and psychopolitics, 
a view that roots back to Romanticism. Contemporary philosophers, like 
the poets, artists, and scholars of the Romantic era, seek answers to the 
complex questions about life with its individual, biological, and social 
dimensions. These questions have added importance when asked in the 
face of a  significant threat such as an epidemic or pandemic. Generally 
speaking, I  show what the basic turn towards broadly understood life, 
which the pandemic puts in question, is present in these two ideologically 
similar currents. On the one hand, the study of biopolitics, psychopolitics, 
and the concepts they use can revitalize our perspective on the histori-
cal period of Romanticism and its presence in contemporary culture? On 
the other hand, it is important to note that biopolitical and psychopoliti-
cal theorists have paid little attention to discussing their Romantic roots as 
a literary and philosophical era. Rather, they focus on contemporary social 
and political science paradigms.
1 A forum for philosophical reflection on the coronavirus pandemic was created in 2020 by the 
European Journal of Psychoanalysis, which published Michel Foucault’s text on “pestilent cities” 
as well as brief reflections by Giorgio Agamben (cf. Coronavirus and philosophers…, 2020). 
These texts are commented on by: Jean-Luc Nancy, Roberto Esposito, Sergio Benvenuto, Divya 
Dwivedi, Shaj Mohan, Rocco Ronchi, Massimo de Carolis (On Pandemics…, 2020). From 
the psychoanalytic perspective, the following authors published their reflections on the pande-
mic: Monique Lauret, Elisabeth Roudinesco, Pietro Pascarelli, Javier Bolaños, Julietta Lucero, 
Florencia Bernthal Raz, Evan Malater, Emma R.  Jones, Pietro Barbetta, and Julia Kristeva) 
(cf. Psychoanalysts facing coronavirus…, 2020). Further literature on the subject is provided on 
the websites I mention.
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1. Romanticism: the cult of nature and life force
Views on various types of disasters caused by natural forces, which may 
include pandemics, have evolved throughout human history. One of the 
significant dates in this matter is 1755, when, after the Lisbon earthquake, 
Voltaire (real name: François-Marie Arouet) wrote Poème sur le désastre de 
Lisbonne (1755) 2, dedicated to the event that, in addition to the death of 
many thousands of people and huge material losses, led to a “worldview 
quake.” In the broadest terms, Voltaire presents two polar opposites: on 
the one hand, there is the requirement to recognize the rationality of the 
natural world as a whole, in which law and order reign; on the other, there 
is the acceptance of the reality of physical evil, of its existence, which is 
not subject to rationalization, just as the sudden outbreak of a pandemic 
is not subject to rationalization. Voltaire oscillates between the “optimism” 
of rational order and the “pessimism” of the triumph of absurd evil. Phi-
losophers of the Enlightenment rejected the traditional Christian notion 
that supernatural forces could intervene in the laws of nature. These laws 
began to be viewed through the lens of mathematical models. In 1779, 
the term statistique appeared in French to denote a quantitative method 
of studying mass phenomena, which is now called statistical inference. By 
the end of the seventeenth century, statistics was a branch of state science 
called Political Arithmetick (cf. Ostasiewicz, 2012). Over the years, it has 
evolved into mathematical statistics, intended to help capture and natu-
rally explain complex, often difficult to grasp relationships between seem-
ingly independent phenomena.
 What Romanticism was, or is, is aptly characterized by Rüdiger 
Safranski: 
Romanticism is an epoch. The Romantic is a state of mind not limited to 
one period. It found its fullest expression in the Romantic epoch, but it 
does not end with that age; the Romantic exists to the present day (Safran-
ski, 2008, p. 6). 
Described so broadly in scope and time, Romanticism encompasses sci-
ence, literature, art, and philosophy, unifying the two aspects of an indi-
vidual’s inner and social lives: Romanticism is the culture of its era. This 
2 Cf. also the passage from Candide referring to the Lisbon earthquake: “Scarce had they set foot 
in the city ..., when they perceived the earth to tremble under their feet, and saw the sea swell 
and foam in the harbor, and dash to pieces the ships that were at anchor. The whirling flames 
and ashes covered the streets and public places, the houses tottered, and their roofs fell under 
the foundations, and the foundations were scattered; thirty thousand inhabitants of all ages and 
sexes were crushed to death in the ruins” (Voltaire, 1991, p. 18).
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is reflected in the views of mathematician, philosopher and scientist Fried-
rich von Schelling (1775–1854): “So long as I myself am identical with 
nature, I understand what a  living nature is as well as I understand my 
own life” (Schelling, 1976, cited in: Fisher, 2020, p. 64, cf. Richards, 2002, 
p. 112). Schelling develops his organic philosophy of nature in opposition 
to Cartesianism, life for him being a Kantian scheme of freedom (encom-
passing the literal and the symbolic). Two aspects of the romantic view of 
life should be noted:
1. A view in which biology was treated as a scientific discipline in its 
own right, although combined with physics and chemistry as subsi-
diary disciplines subordinate to the search for a “new biology.” It was 
assumed that living organisms, unlike artifacts, are primarily goal-
-oriented and cannot be reduced to mechanical processes. The new 
biology was intended to realize a medicine inspired by the Hippo-
cratic Oath and therapeutically oriented: “A new scientifically trai-
ned, activist physician would be one of the chief agents in spreading 
knowledge useful for economic and social improvement, thereby 
preparing the ground for the gradual emergence of a just society” 
(Lenoir, 1990, p. 119). The romantic metaphor of the universe as 
a dynamic and creative organism has been resurrected today and 
is being reused in scientific and colloquial discussions. For exam-
ple, the biogenetic law, which characterized much of the Romantic 
naturalist’s speculation, has been reformulated and readapted to fit 
new discoveries and theories in the natural sciences of the twentieth 
century (cf. Esposito, 2016, p.  4–8). The terms “Romanticism,” 
“organic,” and “anti-mechanistic” were purely descriptive, imply-
ing that the aforementioned intentionality of biological organisms 
was not causal but regulative.
2. Issues of man’s unity with nature, the totality of life (organic, social, 
and individual), and the meaning of individual life are all among 
topics discussed in Romanticism. The thinkers of this period paid 
attention to the inner life of man  – to spirituality, feelings, emo-
tions, but also to the distinctiveness of the human person and their 
individuality. The assumed domination of emotion over reason 
was a rebellion against the existing Enlightenment reality and its 
social norms. Not only scientific empiricism and the rational argu-
ments of the Enlightenment, but also literature, art, and poetry 
were accepted as methods of learning about the world. The typi-
cal romantic literary hero is a rebel who is confrontational in life 
and death, and also motivated to action by passions such as love or 
hate. The romantic hero demands freedom as the highest principle 
of his existence. This has a direct impact on the perception of his 
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passion, which he tries to live without regard for moral responsibi-
lity (cf. Hoffmeister, 1990, p. 169–170).
 Among other things, pandemics were among the phenomena that 
posed a threat to such a conception of life, on its anatomical, spiritual, and 
social levels, as I demonstrate with the example of three Romantic authors 
and their understanding of life. On the one hand, life is a biological phe-
nomenon, and on the other, it takes place in the spiritual-emotional sphere 
and has social consequences.
 Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), a  physician by training, is one of the 
greatest romantic dramatists in German literature. By the time he wrote his 
poem The Plague (Die Pest) in 1782, the black death that had been ravag-
ing Europe for centuries had essentially subsided. By means of the meta-
phorical “poisonous mist” (gift’ger Nebel), Schiller characterizes the deadly 
pathogen of plague, which at the time had not yet been discovered. In the 
last stanza of the poem, the plague (as a protagonist) cheerfully, and alter-
nately with a roar of pleasure, praises God in its own horrible way (“Rap-
ture change to dread alarm. / Thus the plague God wildly praises!”, Schil-
ler, 1880, p. 316), as if aware of its own biologicality, as determined by the 
laws of nature, and thus maliciously challenging either divine omnipotence 
or divine and human powerlessness. Death is seen as a permanent, indelible 
reality of human existence and consciousness. Infected with tuberculosis, 
Schiller said shortly before his death: “Death cannot be an evil because it is 
something general” (Wiese, 1978, cited in: O’Callaghan, 2011, pp. 256–257). 
 The Romantic period poet Juliusz Słowacki (1809–1849), in his poem 
Father of the Plague-Stricken at El Arish (Słowacki, 1932), describes the 
plague as a biological phenomenon, negatively related to the concept of 
life. In the face of the plague, it turns out that nothing is given to man 
“permanently,” nothing is independent of the changing events of blind fate 
or the blind laws of nature. The protagonist of the poem is an Arab, the 
father of a family. His wife and children all die, day after day. This univer-
sal and psychologically profound poem is a tale of undeserved suffering, 
a struggle against a plague, but also against an unfeeling, merciless God-
ruler against whom man has no rights: “I could not think that he would 
take from me / The four who yet remained within my tent” (Słowacki, 
1932, p. 674). The infected family members die quickly and convulsively, 
one hundred and twenty days pass like a moment, and the whole family 
disappears from the face of the earth. The deadly plague acts as a biologi-
cal machine accompanied by the violence and mercilessness of nature. 
That sand-thou hast no children buried there / To thee it seems not mena-
cing but fair, / Gilded perchance, a place of life and mirth- / To me it is the 
plain of hell on earth I (Słowacki, 1932, p. 678).
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Above the desert shines the taunting sun: 
The sun was not the brilliant orb on high, / The shining orb that yesterday 
I knew, / But was a vampire sun of ghostly hue. / The heavens too, which 
gazed upon the death / Of my three children, fading one by one (Słowac ki, 
1932, p. 674).
Hardly does the grief-stricken father lay his children in their grave, that 
already other biological organisms appear nearby – hyenas, “corpse-eat-
ers” – attracted by the presence of decaying bodies.
 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) wrote in a letter to Char-
lotte von Stein (Rome, 8 June 1787): 
Also, I  must say myself, I  think it true that humanity will ultimately 
triumph; only I fear that at the same time the world will become one great 
hospital in which one man will be the other’s humane nurse (Goethe, 
1911, p. 332).
Today (February 16, 2021), according to data from Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, we have had over 142 million people infected with SARS-CoV-2 and 
over three million dead in the around the world’s “great global hospital” 
(Center for Systems Science..., 2021). Coronavirus patients are in almost 
every country in the world. Our Earth is not only an enormous hospital, 
but since the pandemic broke out, it has become a great cemetery with 
mass graves. The mechanism of death is described by Goethe in The Sor-
rows of Young Werther: 
You allow that we designate a disease as mortal when nature is so severely 
attacked, and her strength so far exhausted, that she cannot possibly reco-
ver her former condition under any change that may take place (Goethe, 
1854, p. 285).
In a letter to Johann P. Eckermann, he wrote that when he was exposed to 
contracting putrid fever (Faulfieber), he only avoided it through a deter-
mined attitude of “moral will” and by the fact that “He stayed away from 
the world to stay healthy and fulfill his duties better and better” (Ross-
bacher, 2000, p. 67). His strategy still holds true today and is experiencing 
a  renaissance: discipline and seclusion, staying in quarantine, avoiding 
contact, wearing masks, disinfecting rooms and hands.
 The romantic defense of lofty and sacred ideals appealed to the beauty 
and majesty of the natural world and the value of the inner world of per-
sonal experience. Romanticism exalted the experience of the sacred and 
mysterious, but its explanation of those experiences pointed not, as in the 
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Middle Ages, to transcendence, but to nature. The Romantic answer to the 
question of where we must turn to discover true reality – the ultimate basis 
of consciousness, the source of meaning and beauty – was the same as that 
of the enlightened empiricists and materialists: to the depths of nature.
2. Biopolitics – the fight for “bare life”
In the following pages, I present the views of thinkers concerned with con-
temporary political, social, and cultural transformations: biopolitics and 
psychopolitics. Then I indicate their connections with the understanding 
of the phenomenon of life and its manifestations in the Romantic era out-
lined above.
 According to Michel Foucault (1926–1984), a French psychopatholo-
gist, philosopher, sociologist, and historian, a radical transformation in the 
exercise of power is being revealed since the eighteenth century, when life 
itself became an object of concern for authority. He coined the term “bio-
politics,” which he describes as: “a new technology of power ... exists at 
a different level, on a different scale, and ... it has a different bearing area, 
and makes use of very different instruments” (Foucault, 2003, p.  242). 
What Foucault means is biopower focused on life (individual human bod-
ies and on whole populations), using different mechanisms from those of 
sovereign legal and political power. Biopolitics is a conceptual and oper-
ational framework for social development that promotes bios (life) as the 
central theme of every human endeavor, whether in politics, education, 
the arts, governance, science, or technology. In this conception, bios is 
a  term that refers to all life forms on the planet, including their genetic 
variants from different parts of it. Modern biopolitics does not use a disci-
plinary mechanism, but acts as a population-wide control apparatus.
 Foucault provided numerous examples of biopolitical control: “the 
ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction” (Foucault, 2003, p. 243). 
Modern societies have created technological and political opportunities to 
variously regulate the life of the human species as such. Foucault claims 
that “what might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been 
reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strate-
gies” (Foucault, 1978, p. 143). The French philosopher contrasts the bio-
political method of social control with the control exercised by political 
power in the Middle Ages. In the Middle Ages, pandemics caused death to 
be understood as an integral part of life. In the late 18th century, with the 
advent of the natural sciences, the reality of death was shifted to the realm 
of the biological sciences. The development of vaccines and medicines, on 
top of the introduction of public hygiene recommendations allowed for 
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the control of pandemics and the prevention (and/or halting) of death in 
parts of the population.
 The concepts of biopower and biopolitics are deceptive if they appear 
as current buzzwords providing a  perspective on the actions of govern-
ments in times of pandemic. Foucault developed three models of think-
ing in relation to three infectious diseases that help us better understand 
the actions of governments in the face of pandemics than does the seman-
tic cliché of “biopolitics” (cf. Sarasin, 2020). He repeatedly returned to 
models of these diseases and described the political response to them as 
three models for different forms of government: leprosy (power separates 
the healthy from the sick, excludes deviants and lunatics from society, 
 preferably placing them outside the city gates so as not to care about them 
at all), plague (exercise of power by disciplining society; Foucault, 1995), 
and smallpox (power “coexists” with the pathogen, collects data, and com-
piles statistics; Foucault, 2009, pp. 255–284). Foucault did not talk about 
real pandemics, but he used the phenomena of infectious diseases as mod-
els of thinking in order to organize forms of power according to his ideal 
models. Something opposite to these models is happening now (2019–
2021): we are living in the midst of a real pandemic. Societies are subject to 
top-down directives, and scientists are observing different ways in which 
power and governments operate shown through the media. What can we 
learn from the three models Foucault developed? We observe transitions 
and overlaps between different elements present in the three models. For 
example, the strict lockdown of the city of Wuhan resembles the plague 
model, while the way of handling the issue in South Korea or Singapore is 
oriented according to the smallpox model. Some European countries have 
also slowly moved or are moving towards this operating model.
 According to the chronology provided by Foucault, biopower emerged 
in the West in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In other words, the 
genesis of biopower coincided with the literary historical period called 
Romanticism. Many scholars have actually connected Romanticism and 
biopolitics. The book by Robert Mitchell Experimental life: Vitalism in 
Romantic science and literature (2013), and Sara Guyer’s Reading with John 
Clare: Biopoetics, sovereignty, Romanticism (2015) convincingly demon-
strate that the concept of biopolitics not only can shed new light on the 
well-known Romantic texts (philosophical, scientific, and literary), but 
also reveals some themes on Romanticism that have hitherto remained 
open: for example, the notion that Romanticism is a direct precursor to 
strong 20- and 21st-century nationalisms and environmentalisms.
 In Romanticism, the artist or poet was often treated as a spiritual guide 
with a responsibility for the life of a nation or a population. The Romantics 
rejected the Enlightenment views treating the natural world as a regulated 
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organism; for them it was a  primordial entity, a  mysterious creation, 
eternally alive. In the Romantic era, responsibility for collective life was 
expressed, among other things, in the search for a new biology. Similarly, 
Foucault is concerned “to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life 
in order” (Foucault, 1978, p. 138). Speaking of sustaining and ordering 
life, Foucault refers to the German Romantic notion of “cultivation,” con-
struction or formation (Bildung), which functions as part of a particular 
apparatus of power: an apparatus of individualization and immunization. 
Bildung emphasizes experience, which is not reducible to the precepts of 
pure Enlightenment reason (cf. McCall, 2007, pp. 7–13).
 Against thus outlined background, which emerges after Foucault’s 
announcement of the end of man and humanism, reflections of Ital-
ian political philosopher and totalitarianism scholar Giorgio Agamben 
emerge. The situation created by the coronavirus pandemic seems at first 
glance to resemble the realization of a biopolitical model: governments, 
advised by statisticians and doctors, are imposing a “pandemic dictator-
ship” on the entire population, while getting rid of all democratic obstacles 
under the pretext of “saving lives,” “health,” and “survival.” Ultimately, 
they are able to govern the human population as pure “biomass,” as “bare 
life,” biological life. It is no coincidence that these concepts are invoked by 
Agamben, who introduced the concept of “bare life” into contemporary 
political theory.
 In the book Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life (1998), Agamben 
juxtaposes “sovereign power” and “bare life,” the „sovereign” and „holy 
man” (homo sacer). Both are outlaws: the sovereign stands above the law, 
and the holy man below the law; the sovereign defeats the law, while the 
homo sacer does not grow up to it. 
The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without 
committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life – 
that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed – is the life that has been 
captured in this sphere (Agamben, 1998, p. 53).
The sovereign can put anyone in a state of emergency and place the “holy 
man” in that state. For the authority, everyone is a potential homo sacer. 
For the “holy man,” everyone is a potential authority. Agamben argues: 
It is not possible to understand the ‘national’ and biopolitical development 
and vocation of the modern state in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, if one forgets that what lies at its basis is not man as a free and con-
scious political subject, but, above all, man’s bare life, the simple birth that 
as such is, in the passage from subject to citizen, invested with the princi-
ple of sovereignty (Agamben, 1998, p. 76).
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The bare or pure life is the human being, the same as an animal, with-
out any political definition or mediation. It is the isolation of metaphys-
ics from various forms of concrete life that defines and conditions West-
ern politics. Projects that assume that political communities are based on 
belonging or seeking to establish citizens’ political rights are doomed to 
failure. The figure of the homo sacer is one of the most distinctive ele-
ments of Agamben’s project to redefine sovereignty in biopolitical terms. 
In contrast to the concept of collective political sovereignty as the basis of 
state policy, the homo sacer refers to a more authoritarian model that relies 
on the role of state authority to simultaneously condition and contain the 
transition from a bare life to a rights-owning individual.
 In Homo sacer, Agamben (1998) analyzes Foucault’s work and places 
it once again in an area that the latter wanted to break with: the field of 
sovereignty. Agamben argues that the power of the sovereign is not tied to 
the ability to assert rights, but is implicitly tied to “bare life,” which is a life 
incorporated into the political universe through paradoxical exclusion, and 
which is subject to the violence and decisions of the sovereign. It would be 
interesting to explore the notion of biological power in relation to sover-
eign power, in order to assess its significance and productiveness, and what 
this brings to our understanding of modernity and postmodernity.
 Foucault described “pestilent cities” where authorities exercised sur-
veillance to control the contagion of disease. It was a kind of early form 
of observing others that allowed the authorities to remain anonymous. 
The governments of these cities implemented administrative procedures 
at the street level with the intention of implementing quarantines under-
stood in terms of “strict spatial division”: “It is a segmented, immobile, fro-
zen space. Each individual is fixed in his place. And, if he moves, he does 
so at the risk of his life, contagion or punishment” (Foucault, 1995, p. 195). 
Agamben, on the other hand, citing Foucault to some extent, writes about 
how COVID-19 has reinforced the tendency to impose and use the state 
of emergency as the normal mode of government during a pandemic.
 One of the first phenomena that Agamben believes have manifested 
themselves in the wave of pandemic panic paralyzing entire countries is 
that our societies no longer believe in anything but bare life. On the one 
hand, it is clear that many of us are willing to sacrifice virtually every-
thing  – normal living conditions, social relationships, ordinary work, 
even friendships and religious or political beliefs – in order to avoid the 
deadly threat of disease (cf. Agamben, 2020). On the other hand, however, 
it appears that in many cases COVID-19 virus infection causes mild, flu-
like symptoms. In addition, it is estimated that only a few percent of cases 
require intensive care. Hence questions about the accuracy of the news 
reports in the media and the reactions of the authorities, who themselves 
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did much to bring about the panic, thus creating a genuine state of emer-
gency with severe restrictions on the daily life in almost all regions of the 
world.
 With reference to the notion of homo sacer, Agamben criticizes “roman-
tic ideolo gy” (i.e., the illusion that poetry can liberate us from the bonds 
of culture and history), noting that it attempts to define the concept of 
“the people” in relation to the concept of “language” by explaining “some-
thing that was already obscure (the concept of a  people) with the help 
of something even more obscure (the concept of language)” (Agamben, 
2007, p. 144). He points out that the idea of there being an entity called 
“the people” or an entity called “the language” that can be clearly and 
coherently defined is a fiction of the Romantic thought, which (by estab-
lishing a “symbiotic equivalence” between the two concepts) transformed 
two adventitious and indeterminate cultural entities into almost natural 
organisms equipped with their own necessary rights and characteristics. 
3. Psychopolitics – digitized world, digitized humanism
Born in Seoul in 1959, cultural theorist and philosopher Byung-Chul Han 
studied philosophy, literature and theology in Germany, where he now 
lives. He is among the most creative and prolific minds analyzing and cri-
tiquing contemporary Western society. In his view, we live in a society of 
biological survival that is ultimately based on the fear of death. Today, sur-
vival, or staying alive, appears to be the highest good, which creates a belief 
that we are in a constant state of war.
Life has never been as fleeting as it is today. Not just human life, but the 
world in general is becoming radically fleeting. Nothing promises dura-
tion or substance [Bestand]. Given this lack of Being, nervousness and 
unease arise. Belonging to a species might benefit an animal that works 
for the sake of its kind to achieve brute Gelassenheit. However, the late-
-modern ego [Ich] stands utterly alone. Even religions, as thanatotechnics 
that would remove the fear of death and produce a  feeling of duration, 
have run their course. The general denarrativization of the world is rein-
forcing the feeling of fleetingness. It makes life bare. Work itself is a bare 
activity. The activity of bare laboring corresponds entirely to the bare life. 
Merely working and merely living define and condition each other (Han, 
2015, p. 18).
The enlightened modern person has lost not only faith in God, but also 
her Romantic faith in nature, in the very reality of commonly understood 
reality. All of this makes human life radically ephemeral. Life in today’s 
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digitalized, often virtual world and society, according to Han, is much 
more complex and difficult than life as a homo sacer. Authority acts in ways 
that elude theorists’ observations; it allows itself to be granted the right to 
apply law in the name of a positively understood social good. Hyperac-
tive people today are not subjected to the controls or disciplinary repres-
sion presented by Foucault. Society today is not one where the exercise 
of power is reduced to disciplining citizens by placing them in hospitals, 
nursing homes, insane asylums, prisons, barracks, or institutions. The 
place of such a society has long been taken over by a society of fitness clubs, 
office buildings, banks, airports, cheap airline tickets, the Internet, cellular 
networks, shopping malls, and genetic laboratories. The society of the 21st 
century, then, is not one of control, discipline, or isolation, but one focused 
on achievement and realization thereof. We are “achievement subjects.” 
We are constantly encouraged to see our lives as series of new “projects” 
that we can pursue, with a myriad of opportunities for self-improvement 
that are offered to us. We are emotionally stimulated to achieve a variety 
of successes. We adore our personal projects, using smartphones that track 
our steps, likes, and shares of our “tweets” (cf. Han, 2017, p. 22). We are 
managers of ourselves. The walls of disciplining institutions that used to 
separate the normal from the abnormal seem anachronistic today. 
 Foucaultian analyses of the workings of power fail to describe the psy-
chological and temporal-spatial changes that have occurred in the tran-
sition from a  disciplined society to a  society of achievement. The oft-
used Foucaultian notion of the “society of control” does not reflect these 
changes either; it still contains too many negative connotations. In this 
kind of new society, economic capital becomes more important. But no 
enemy nor any strangers oppress us or threaten us or infect us from the 
outside of thus understood modern society. We “burn out” with our count-
less self-improvement projects. The Internet, on the one hand, clarifies 
this process, but on the other, it exacerbates and facilitates this kind of 
burnout.
 We are under the threat of the Covid-19 pandemic putting the soci-
ety of achievement under increasing scrutiny and imposing biopolitically 
understood regimes of surveillance, control, and quarantine, resulting 
in the loss of previous freedoms. Collective fear and hysteria can put an 
end to living in our connected welfare. The present pandemic has already 
brought mass dying into the light of day, which in turn is causing increas-
ing anxiety in a society focused on individual achievement (cf. Sigüenza & 
Rebollo, 2020). 
 Han (2020) lists nine characterizations of the coronavirus pandemic, 
placing it in a broader perspective than homo sacer, a summary of which 
I give below:
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1. The coronavirus pandemic shows that human vulnerability or mor-
tality is not democratic, but rather depends on the social status of 
the sick person. Dying was never democratic. The poor get sick and 
die on the outskirts of big cities, while the rich move to their homes 
outside the city.
2. A pandemic is not only a medical problem but also a  social one. 
Countries with little social disparity fare better in times of crisis.
3. COVID-19 does not support democracy, but rather autocratic rule. 
In times of crisis, people are looking for strong leaders.
4. As pandemics develop, we are moving toward a biopolitical surve-
illance system. Not only our communication, but even our bodies 
and our health are becoming subject to digital surveillance. The 
pandemic shock will result in the consolidation of digital biopolitics 
around the world that, through electronic systems. It will take con-
trol and surveillance of our bodies, to create a biopolitical, discipli-
ned society with constant monitoring of citizens’ health.
5. The virus has shown that we live in a society of biological survi-
val that is ultimately based on the fear of death. Survival is seen as 
something absolute, as if we are in a constant state of war. All vital 
forces are employed to prolong life. The survival society has lost its 
sense of quality of life. That which is pleasurable is sacrificed for the 
highest goal, i.e., health.
6. The pandemic makes death visible again. The presence of death in 
media makes people nervous. Survival hysteria turns society into 
something inhuman. Something or someone right next to us is 
a potential virus carrier and we need to stay away from it/them. The 
elderly are dying alone in nursing homes because no one is willing 
or able to visit them because of the risk of infection.
7. To survive, we voluntarily sacrifice everything that makes life worth 
living and the sense of community and intimacy worth experien-
cing. Religious communities give up services in order to survive. 
Love is revealed through alienation; the religious narrative of resur-
rection gives way to an ideology of health and survival.
8. The panicked reactions to the virus show that something is wrong 
with our society.
9. COVID-19 is probably not a good omen for the countries of Europe 
and the United States. The virus is a  test for the functioning of 
various political and economic systems.
 Asian countries, which tend to allow less liberty, took control of the 
pandemic fairly quickly. The winners in the fight against the coronavi-
rus are such countries as Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan or 
Singapore, where an authoritarian mentality derived from the cultural 
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traditions (Confucianism) is still entrenched. To confront the virus, Asians 
are increasingly using electronic surveillance, and doing countless tests 
for the disease. These treatments may lead to the development of various 
methods of digital surveillance that are difficult to imagine for Western 
societies focused on individual achievement. In the aforementioned coun-
tries, not only virologists and epidemiologists, but also teams of computer 
scientists and Big Data specialists are fighting the epidemic and tracking 
the spread of the pandemic. According to Han, “‘Big Data’ enables pre-
diction of human responses and the future, therefore, can be manipulated 
accordingly. Big Data has the ability to turn people into puppets” (Han, 
2016). Big Data are a kind of continuation of the hopes placed in the afore-
mentioned Enlightenment practice of statistical research.
 The achievement society is shedding its increasingly negative percep-
tion of control that progressing deregulation is removing. Instead of prohi-
bition, order or rule, there come: design, initiative and motivation. A dis-
ciplined society is constantly exposed to resistance expressed in a general 
“don’t”; this opposition in turn generates lunatics and criminals. Instead, 
the achievement society generates depressed people and losers. The posi-
tive phrase that defines achievement societies is the unlimited, often self-
destructive “can,” the first-person plural of this affirmation is the widely 
known Yes, we can! It is supposed to express the positive nature of the new 
society. We are at the same time dealing with a kind of “exploitation”. Usu-
ally, “exploitation” means that someone is used by someone else. Han, 
however, believes that in reality, we are exploiting ourselves. “The crisis we 
are now experiencing follows from our blindness and stupefaction” (Han, 
2017, p. ix). The “crisis” essentially refers to two things: first, the one of 
our democracy, caused by the shallowness of digital communication, social 
media, information overload, etc. According to Han, this crisis manifests 
itself in questioning the importance of critical thinking, respect, trust, etc. 
Secondly, it leads to consequences experienced on a personal level, such as 
stress, depression, professional burnout, suicide, etc.
 The sudden presence of the invisible coronavirus puts a  strong ques-
tion mark on the “can” mentality, making us aware of the transience of the 
achievement-oriented life, and the camouflaged form of “exploitation,” also 
showing us the two aspects of the crisis in which our society has found itself.
4. Conclusions
The multidimensional crisis created by the Covid-19 pandemic has 
revealed the ambivalence of our human condition in the 21st century. 
On the one hand, it consists of an increasing number of cases and deaths, 
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a  lack of clarity about the possibility of further recurrences of the pan-
demic, its side effects, and the effectiveness of different types of vaccines. In 
addition, it is accompanied by the closure of entire sectors of the economy, 
pushing the limits of health care capacity, the growing numbers of peo-
ple with depression, and the increase in domestic violence. It is possible 
that the economic and social impact of the pandemic will keep affecting 
even the world’s richest countries in the coming years. On the other hand, 
pandemic-induced development also provides an exceptionally favorable 
opportunity to restructure societies, perhaps not always in the spirit of 
democracy. The pandemic shook up many popular beliefs that had hith-
erto been considered more or less unassailable. State interventionism – in 
the economy as well as in culture – is again seen by many as a necessary 
aid to survival or maintaining pre-pandemic living standards. 
 In Foucault’s work, biopolitics takes the form of concrete policies by 
authorities that target individuals not as “legal subjects” but as “living 
beings.” For Agamben, the nation-state is to some extent biopolitical for 
the reason that it engages man not as a free and conscious political subject, 
but primarily focuses on homo sacer, the bare life of man. 
 Foucault and Agamben refer to the literary, philosophical, and cultural 
legacy of the Romantic era and show its reflection in biopolitics. In the lat-
ter’s work, references to that era appear in historical retrospect, when, for 
example, he analyzes the birth of clinics or points to Romantic  ideology. 
Han advocates the romantic cult of the individual, passionate hero as 
a symbol of resistance to what he sees as the modern cult of tranquility 
and achievement in the digitized world that makes it possible. “To me, 
the Romantic world of [German poet Friedrich] Hölderlin is the world 
of the future” (Han, cited in: Oltermann, 2017). Unlike Foucault’s con-
trolled society where people know that their freedom is limited, people in 
the achievement society are also controlled but are falsely convinced that 
they are free. This shift from disciplining the body (biopolitics) to con-
trolling the mind (psychopolitics) is happening in a seductive and cam-
ouflaged way. Consequently, people become inclined to even aggressively 
exploit themselves until they burn out and begin to suffer from depression, 
for example. Somewhere along the way, the Romantic reference to reality 
and nature is lost in all that.
 In conclusion, I would like to add that the scientific and practical use 
of the knowledge of philosophers, literary scholars, historians, and socio-
logists, in addition to the importance of the disciplines they practice, is not 
to multiply the knowledge of the debates these scholars have had with each 
other in peaceful times. The times of the pandemic are filled with  real 
threats to life itself. Hence, the challenge for humanists or sociologists 
today is to be able to think fruitfully about the unknown, the disturbing, 
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the challenging, and even the repulsive. It is also to look for historical par-
allels, solutions, and to construct appropriate models that can clarify the 
current situation helping individuals and whole societies. They involve 
modifying historically existing debates, but more importantly, identifying 
new and current issues related to the COVID-19 virus pandemic in light 
thereof. 
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